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Abstract 
The instruments used by regulators to promote competition and integration in the 
face of problems such as those related to payment methods can generate 
disincentives, especially in the absence of adequate information to guarantee the 
rationality of agents. This is particularly relevant because these markets exhibit 
particularities and asymmetries that differentiate them from other more 
traditional markets (different sides, network economies, cross-transfers, hidden 
costs, large externalities, and so on), characteristics which make them more 
dependent on the quality and quantity of information. Therefore, when this 
information is inadequate, more failures than can be solely attributed to market 
regulation tend to occur. In this paper we argue that interventions in "two-sided” 
payment cards markets (2SMs) to reduce costs to merchants may in the end harm 
the interests of consumers and discourage penetration of cards as a payment 
method and their increased use in retail operations. In our study we analyze and 
simulate the effects of the legislative package on electronic payments proposed by 
the European Commission in July 2013, which seeks to force a top-down 
convergence, similar to that designed for domestic interest rates with the euro, and 
which has proven to be a failure during the recent debt crisis. 
 
1. Two-sided markets (2SMs): market and State failures  
Means of payment markets, and more specifically those of card payments, can be 
characterized as bilateral markets or "two-sided markets” (2SMs). The academic 
literature on 2SMs is one of the most extensive and rapidly growing in economics: at 
the beginning of December 2013 Google registered almost 67,000 citations about 2SMs, 
of which nearly one-tenth referring to an academic context, where the term is used to 
describe a number of increasingly extensive sectoral markets (M. Rysman, 2013)2. 
Research or forums promoted by the OECD noted some years ago the application of 
these markets in dozens of sub-sectors (OECD, 2009)3, although most of them were 
service or tertiary markets, where the cases most frequently analyzed were the markets 
of payment cards, real estate agents, video game console software, advertising and on-
line auctions or dating agencies. 
1.1 Most relevant theories  
Throughout this literature there is a broad consensus in attributing at least the following 
seven characteristics to two-sided markets, which we propose to explain from an 
economic-structural perspective: 
                                                          
2
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3
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-They are made up of different types of agents; not only the main ones (producers- 
consumers, merchants-users, etc.), but also others such as providers of other services. 
The literature on payment cards is one those that has most contributed to the concept 
and study of 2SMs. 
- They facilitate the interconnection of these agents, which is often done by the use of 
platforms, which provide a common meeting place (real or virtual) where different 
customer groups may interact, so that in principle they represent an instrument to reduce 
transaction costs among the participants. 
-The relationship between agents is also facilitated by information, which is now seen 
as an institution or superstructure and not mere infrastructure, apart from that which 
moves on platforms where relationships are created. Information, as we shall see, is a 
crucial element not only to justify prices and price formation, but also to explain the 
failures of other institutions, such as the market or the State, often as a result of 
interventions. These “solutions” in any case affect competition, and hence the bulk of 
the literature on 2SMs effectively deals with competition. 
-Thus, 2SMs form networks (types of relations: structures and systems), as also 
confirmed by the fact that the vast majority of the academic literature attributes to them 
network economies, enhanced by the use of information that benefits the two main 
interconnected parts (the case of businesses and consumers in the cards market, for 
example). Such economies belong to the so-called new economy, understood as an 
information economy driven by knowledge (Terceiro and Matías, 2001)4, and which are 
clearly different from the more traditional economies of scale or scope, characterized as 
energy-driven economies. For example, Metcalfe's Law, stating that the value or 
usefulness of a network grows as a square of the number of users, boosted by other laws 
emerging from the information economy, such as Moore’s law (each year and a half the 
power of computer processors doubles). 
 -These 2SM platforms contribute to creating pricing structures, that is, to 
structuring the information that most interests the markets and their agents. Therefore, 
they also structure prices through the various incentive schemes and orientations they 
generate. As noted by R. Seamans and F Zhu (2011)5 “One of the empirical challenges 
associated with studying multi-sided markets is collecting price data on all sides of the 
market”. 
-Such pricing structures are influenced by side effects and externalities or external 
economies, as are those of income and welfare of agents. These can be positive 
(reducing crowds, traffic or pollution, for example) or negative (new external costs such 
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as time and “shoe leather” which the consumer must spend looking for cash at ATMs, 
as an alternative to use of cards or other means of electronic payment). But also the side 
effects of rational choice among agents can be very important, such as tax evasion or 
labour fraud, or larger submerged and illegal or even criminal economies which take 
advantage of cash, which lacks the transparency and traceability of electronic payments, 
except those made in some new form of electronic money such as bitcoins. 
-In pursuing gain in each and every one of the above features, 2SMs generate 
innovation because previous network economies and their externalities can cause both 
problems as well as benefits. Some already-cited network economies may also create 
diseconomies: the privacy and security of a network is inversely proportional to the 
number of nodes in the network; hence the relevance of innovation and its influence on 
their distribution. 
1.2 Failures of the Market and the State 
In addition to seeking the optimal functioning of 2SMs, theories - just like empirical 
studies - try to identify whether they produce both market failures and regulatory 
intervention. The character of 2SMs produces the paradox that, as instruments to 
organize and structure information, they themselves generate information asymmetries. 
“There is no apparent basis in today's economics - at a theoretical or empirical level - 
for concluding that it is generally possible to improve social welfare by a noticeable 
reduction in privately set interchange fees”,  conclude Richard Schmalensee  and David 
S. Evans (2005)6 
The two main market failures arise from access to and use of information by 
agents, which limit their logical use, hampered by the fragmentation of the markets. 
This is the case of adverse selection (doing business with people that are best avoided) 
and moral risk. Adverse selection can be a problem when there is asymmetric 
information between the seller and the buyer, since a good or service can be profitable 
for buyers only when they have adequate information about the risks it incurs. Moral 
hazard means that an agent performs actions that the other cannot handle even when 
covered by insurance. In both cases there is asymmetric information which generates 
instability that often leads to market failures. But the State can also cause failure, such 
as when government regulation or intervention leads to imperfections of information or 
practices of regulatory capture. In such cases market forces – that is, the power of the 
market expressed in monopolistic competition methods or practices in supply and 
demand - fail to be corrected. 
                                                          
6
 Schmalensee and Evans (2005): The Economics of Interchange Fees and their Regulation: An Overview, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=744705 
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2. How prices are formed in the two-sided cards market 
The electronic payments market is not only a good example of a 2SM, but most of the 
literature deals with this type of institution, in analyzing how prices are formed and 
structured. Most of the theoretical and empirical literature focuses on three main 
models, where primarily the prices based on interchange fees, merchant service 
charges and consumer price discrimination are analyzed 
This literature reflects the worldwide turmoil in recent years caused by the rapid 
advance in the process of replacing cash, accelerating globally even during the years of 
crisis with the presence of internet and mobile phone payments, which have attracted 
new operators (Paypal, telecommunications companies and ICTs such as Google) and 
boosted already existing or incumbent operators. The replacement of cash by electronic 
payments has accelerated, as shown by the volume of payments throughout the 
economy, but particularly in terms of card payments related to private consumption and 
retail. 
Even in the first four years of the recent crisis, card payments have increased from $ 7.4 
trillion - 27.4% of all retail payments - in 20087 to almost 33%, $ 9.9 trillion in 2012, 
with an annual growth of 7.7%, more than double that other forms of payments (average 
2.9%), whereas in the case of cash over the same period its share went down from 
42.2% to 38.3%. 
 
In any case, the bilateral card market takes different forms depending on the 
participants: there are two-party, three-party and four-party schemes. The most 
widespread are those that involve more parties - Visa or MasterCard bank cards - 
because participating on the one hand there are banks and consumers, and on the other 
there are acquiring banks and merchants. In three-party schemes a commercial company 
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Euromonitor (2012), International Merchant Segment Study, cited by  Moodys Analytics (2013): The 
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provides services directly to consumers and merchants (American Express and Diners 
Club, for example)8. In two-party schemes only consumers and businesses are involved, 
the businesses issuing their own “private” cards. The latter account for nearly a quarter 
of all those in Spain; the three-party schemes (primarily American Express) have a 1-
2% share; and the rest are what are known as “bank cards” 9, the only ones on which are 
published official statistics concerning number, transactions and fees. Four-party 
schemes employ both debit cards (in the majority and the fastest growing) as well as 
credit cards. 
 
2.1 Theoretical models 
Of the three models mentioned above, the first dates back to the contributions made 
decades ago by Baxter (1983), a pioneer in justifying the necessity of multilateral 
interchange fees (MIFs). 
Each time a commercial transaction occurs, the issuing bank (on behalf of the 
cardholder) pays the acquiring bank (on behalf of the merchant) for the value of the 
service or product purchased less the MIF. This is the payment for the issuer. 
Similarly, the acquiring bank retains a portion of the money received from the 
merchant, called the merchant service charge (MSC)10. These fees, therefore, are 
usually larger than interchange fees, since theoretically they encompass both the 
remuneration of the issuer as well as that of the acquirer, for facilitating the means of 
payment to the merchant and for providing him the payment days, weeks or months in 
advance of the consumer’s payment. 
In practice, both fees are complemented by the banks with other income in the form of 
fees for other services related to cards, received from the consumer by the issuing bank 
and from the merchant by the acquiring bank, an issue which will be discussed later in 
detail. 
                                                          
8
 In the four-party system, the issuer has a contractual relationship with the cardholder and the acquirer 
has a contractual relationship with the merchant. In the three-party system the network acts as issuer 
and acquirer and has a direct contractual relationship with the cardholder and the merchant; a variant is 
the three-party model where other service providers obtain an issuing and/or acquiring license (called 
“three-party card networks  with licensees”), according to the definition of the ECB. Among the three-
party networks operating in the EU are American Express and Diners Club, while the four-party networks 
include Visa Europe, MasterCard and the vast majority of domestic networks. The three-party networks 
are basically credit card networks, while the four-party networks are debit card and credit card 
networks. Older Member States still have at least one domestic card network that only allows domestic 
payments. This is the case, for example, of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy and 
Portugal. 
 
9
 DBK: Competitors: tarjetas de pago, 2007.  
 
10
 In the European literature this is known as the merchant service charge (MSC), while in the American 
literature it is called the discount fee (DF). 
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The function that Baxter attributed to MIFs is addressing those market failures caused 
by negative externalities (such as the so-called “shoe leather costs” which payment 
cards save), in the face of which these fees have the potential to align benefits and social 
costs. 
Along the same lines, some theorists argue that MIFs and MSCs are needed to 
encourage the use of electronic payment methods, while others claim that MIFs 
artificially inflate the cost of accepting cards. But, for most analyses, the key is 
precisely the fact that the bilaterality of the market makes strategic interaction difficult, 
not between the acquiring or issuing bank and the consumers and merchants but 
between the latter two - the main agents of retail trade - with their different interests. 
The most significant authors who reject this strategic interaction are Rochet and Tirole 
(2006)11 (supplemented in 2010), and Verdier (2009)12. However, Wright (2001)13 
previously stated that, despite the acknowledged difference of interests, MIFs and 
MSCs help maximize the volume of payments by bringing the interests of both parties 
into balance. 
The third model is based on the dynamics of surcharges or price discrimination 
(selling the same units at different prices), consisting in assigning different prices for 
the same service to maximize revenues, from lower prices to buyers with maximum 
market power to linear prices which do not discriminate against the consumer.  
In summary, the discussion of the above three models of pricing revolves around two 
fundamental issues, which can be expressed as a single idea: how to ensure efficiency 
without affecting free competition. There is a broad consensus that the lowest level of 
government intervention and an increased transparency in pricing schemes contribute 
significantly to the efficiency of payment schemes, aided by product innovation. 
No less important in the academic debate is the question about whether MIFs should 
be set bilaterally or multilaterally. Even from the majority view that the balance 
between the value achieved by consumers and merchants should be achieved in 
heterogeneous markets and situations of underuse or overuse should be avoided, it is 
recognized that it is not the same to maximize profits, fees or welfare. This is accepted 
by Schmalensee (2001), Wright (2004) and Rochet and Tirole (2006), and even Evans, 
who is more sceptical with respect to reaching an optimum in any of the schemes, and 
                                                          
11
 Rochet, Jean-Charles, y Tirole, Jean, Two-sided markets: a progress report, The RAND Journal of 
Economics, Volume 37, Issue 3, pages 645–667, September 2006, supplemented by PLATFORM 
COMPETITION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS, Journal of the European Economic Association Volume 1, Issue 
4, article first published online: 13 DEC 2010. 
12
 Verdier, Marianne, Interchange fees in payment card systems: a survey of the literature, Journal of 
Economic Surveys, Volume 25, Issue 2, pages 273–297, April 2011. 
13
 Wright, Julien, The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, Economics 
Working Papers, University of Auckland, j.wright@auckland.ac.nz 
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even less by reducing MIFs. But Chakravorti (2003), Chakravorti and Roson (2006), 
Schwartz and Vincent (2006), Guthrie and Wright (2007), Chakravorti (2007), Bolt and 
Chakravorti (2008a; 2008b), Marquez (2009) and Rochet and Wright (2009; 2010) have 
commented on their impact on social welfare and consumer credit. 
 
2.2 Empirical models.  
However, most theoretical models have not been subjected to empirical tests, even 
those which argue the benefits of reducing MIFs at all costs. Furthermore, even taking 
into account different costs for different payment methods, they differ in approaches 
and definitions used, especially in the face of a more general but interesting problem 
related to the optimizing of payment schemes: the replacement of cash by electronic 
money. 
In the empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of this method of payment compared 
to others see Humphrey et al. (2006), García-Swartz et al. (2006) and Bergman et al. 
(2007). 
Faced with such an approach, others have observed that usually the merchant charges 
the same price, regardless of the type of payment method used by consumers (Bolt and 
Chakravorti, 2008b). Hence, merchants have tended to find three solutions in order to 
reduce their costs related to the means of payment and recoup the MSC that the 
acquiring bank charges them on card sales: 
 Claim a reduction in MSC reducing the MIFs paid by acquiring banks to 
issuing banks. 
 Discourage the use of bank cards by technical constraints or offer discounts to 
those who use cash. 
 Apply surcharges to the client to claw back the cost of the MSC, a practice 
that is used alongside those above in some countries (Chakravati and Shah, 
2003), but which was prohibited in Spain until June 18, 2010 (Article 24.3 of 
the Ministerial Order on transparency which extends law 16/2009 on Payment 
Services), although since 2012 the Government has announced that it will use 
the new Consumer Act to prohibit surcharges in electronic commerce. 
Therefore, the theoretical and empirical literature focuses primarily on the merchant and 
his decision whether or not to accept cards and/or evade their cost. The former tends to 
focus in MIFs as the most relevant of card costs, whereas the empirical literature does 
the same in respect to MSCs and deals with the practices that attempt to avoid the 
impact of these charges. 
2.3 Other direct and indirect costs 
The above discussion highlights that we are looking at markets and agents that can be 
characterized not only by the formation of bilateral or two-sided markets around 
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merchants-acquiring banks, and consumers-issuing banks, but also by the imposition of 
other direct and indirect costs; these usually derive from asymmetries in market power 
and the use of information, and are summarized below: 
-Create subsidies or cross-subsidies of income among agents. 
-Register a multiplicity of prices as primary incentives, either simultaneous or 
alternative: MIF between issuing banks and card acquirers, MSC between the 
acquirers and the merchants, surcharges by merchants, issuing commissions, 
maintenance fees, interest on credit cards, arrears charges or reclamation of balance 
commissions, prizes, commissions for installing and maintaining cash terminals, 
commissions for withdrawing cash... to name just a dozen of the main costs that have 
surfaced in the market. 
- Complement these prices, costs or incentives with contracts containing hidden 
costs, mainly including seigniorage and the decline of income or the increase in 
public expenditure derived from the costs of the underground economy which 
functions via the principal alternative means of payment: cash. 
-The numerous and high externalities or external economies already indicated, 
such as the so-called “shoe-leather” costs or savings, or those of fraud, traffic, 
pollution, etc. 
-The significant presence of other practices that affect regulation and 
competition, in addition to cross-subsidies and externalities, such as mainly 
economies of scale and network economies, as well as the new rules of the 
information economy and of spirals of innovation (highly relevant in payment 
networks today which operate via Internet, and to which a quarter of world economic 
growth in the last decade is attributed), price discrimination, predatory pricing, 
opportunity costs and many others. 
-The increasing controversial attempts at public intervention on fees, most of 
which have been registered in member countries of the European Union (including 
Spain from 2005 to 2010), without the presentation of a theoretical or empirical 
analysis of cases or effects. 
- Attempts at intervention by the European Union to extend the regulation not 
only of fees, but of the aforementioned rules of competition (facilitating the entry of 
Internet businesses, separating businesses, HCR, etc.) without providing any 
theoretical support showing that the alleged greater opportunities for entrants to 
compete with incumbents will be effective in lowering prices and improving service. 
Not only in these sectors, but also in others which have been regulated in this sense 
during the last two decades (telecommunications, energy, banking, etc.), have serious 
criticisms been raised about whether the approaches taken have actually improved 
the position of consumers. 
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From the extensive economic literature on all these costs ( ECB14 ) can be derived a 
table of four agents and thirty major costs (excluding those transferred between agents) 
as shown in the following table: 
Agents Type of private cost  Income/Cost 
Central Bank Internal Costs Production of coins and notes 
  Distribution of cash 
  Inspection of forgery, storage and destruction of 
damaged notes 
 Transfers Seigniorage in the internal cash holdings 
  Seigniorage in foreign currency holdings 
Retail banks 
/Distribution 
companies 
Internal costs Distribution of cash (cash machines/ bank 
branches) 
  Receiving and processing commercial deposits 
  Card production and distribution 
  Authorization of card payments 
  Provision of POS terminals to businesses 
  Processing costs 
  Fraud prevention costs 
 Transferences Income from commissions on  deposits 
  Income from commissions on purchases 
  Income from card commissions 
  Income derived from delay between sale and 
reimbursement 
  Loss of interest of cash holdings 
Merchants Internal costs Cost of time required to make a payment 
  Clearing of cash registers, collection and deposit 
of bank surpluses 
  Losses due to theft and forgery 
  Card terminals, if these are not provided by the 
bank 
  Communication costs 
 Transferences Deposit fees 
  Commercial services fees 
  Loss of interest of cash holdings 
Consumers Internal costs Cost of time required to make a payment 
  Cost of obtaining money (Cash machines/ bank 
branches) 
  Fraud /Loss/Theft of money 
 Transferences Commissions for transactions and cards 
  Loss of interest of cash holdings 
Source: Costly Cash: a synthesis of international evidence on the cost of making 
payments, 2011 
 
                                                          
14
 European Central Bank (2012), ‘The social and private costs of retail payment instruments, a European 
perspective’ 
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3. Impact on the consumer 
The end consumer ends up paying all costs, including those of 2SM platforms, in the 
final price. 
It is obvious that when setting their prices companies try to cover all costs incurred, 
both fixed and variable, adding a margin and trying to maximize their profit. We have 
stressed the word try because companies always act subject to the restrictions of market 
competition, depending on their “market power” in setting prices. This performance 
strategy is incorporated into some theoretical models which have led over time to a 
variety of different approaches in economic theory. 
As Kalecki (1956)15 noted, variations in the prices of manufactured products are 
determined by the costs in the short term. On this basis, he puts forward a model in 
which companies set their selling prices (P) based on their costs (U) and a certain 
weighted average of the selling prices of the competition (PC) 
 
P = m U + n PC 
 
where m and n are coefficients whose value determines the margin of the company and 
that this will be fixed depending on its market power. 
 
Alternatively, Eichner (1973) 16 notes that in a monopoly or oligopoly market structure, 
a company uses its market power to set prices above marginal cost μ, using the well- 
known margin model (or mark-up model, formulated in its original version by Hall and 
Hitch, 1939), 
 
P = (1+θ) µ 
 
θ being the percentage of the margin (θ> 1) 
 
 
 
As an alternative formulation of the margin model, companies set their selling price 
based on their variable costs (Uv) 
 
P = Uv (1 + θ) 
 
Since the variations in costs cannot be transferred automatically to the prices, to the 
extent that the company has the capacity to vary its margin, the prices can also be 
modified, and which in the end will depend on both factors. And, without doubt, 
competition is the key determinant in the capacity to set business margins. 
 
                                                          
15
 M. Kalecki (1956), Teoría de la dinámica económica: ensayo sobre los movimientos cíclicos y a largo 
plazo de la economía capitalista, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México. 
 
16
 Eichner, A. S. (1973), A Theory of the Determination of the Mark-up Under Oligopoly, Economic 
Journal, 83(332), December. 
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Of course there are many other factors that affect pricing. For example, those affecting 
the variation in prices (Klenow and Malin, 2010)17, such as the level of and changes in 
inflation, the frequency and magnitude of cost and demand shocks, the structure and 
degree of market competition or the methods used in the preparation of official 
statistics. 
But returning to two-sided markets (four-party), if companies shift (or attempt to shift) 
all their costs (particularly variable costs) onto the selling price, this implies that it is the 
consumer who ends up supporting all the costs the company has incurred, including 
specifically those costs generated by the means of payment used by the consumer to pay 
the final price of the good or service. One of these costs is the merchant service charge 
(MSC) that the commercial sector supports but in the end is just shifted onto the final 
price paid by the consumer when a card is used as a means of payment. So, too, the 
consumer ends up paying the increased costs to the commercial sector when cash is 
used to make a payment. Likewise, the consumer ends up paying the cost of the 
electricity used in lighting stores. The same is true of many of the types of costs in 
incurred by the issuing banks and acquiring banks negotiating with merchants to install 
point of sale (POS) terminals, as could equally be said of those who have installed 
ATMs for cash withdrawals by consumers. All of these costs are finally reflected in the 
end price paid by consumers. But although all the costs are transferred to the selling 
price, this does not mean that the company will be indifferent and will accept any level 
of costs: on the contrary, since if the company does not adequately monitor its costs it 
will become uncompetitive and lose market share. 
4. The costs of payment methods 
The recent literature on means of payment insists on distinguishing between private 
costs for agents and costs for the entire economy, also known as social costs18, for 
example ECB (2012). But a detailed reading leads to the conclusion that it only 
estimates production costs of all agents, excluding consumers, assigning an annual total 
of 130,000 million (1.15% of GDP), with the following breakdown: 50% banks, 46% 
merchants, 3% central banks  and 1% cash carriers19. 
 
                                                          
17
 P.J. Klenow,  B.A. Malin (2010), Microeconomic evidence on price-setting. Working paper 15826. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. March.  
18
 The literature often uses the terms social cost and cost for the entire economy interchangeably. But 
according Dot.econ (2011), "Costly Cash: a synthesis of international evidence on the cost of making 
payments," the social cost should include, in addition to the sum of the internal costs of all agents other 
costs included in Table 1, such as the underground economy associated with the use of cash or 
seigniorage. 
 
19
 ECB: The social and private costs of retail payment instruments, Occasional Paper No 137, September 
2012. In footnote 3 of the study, the ECB recognizes that “the social costs of payment instruments to 
households and consumers are beyond the scope of the current study”.   
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Other estimates by Retail Banking Research (RBR) in The Future of Cash and 
Payment, place the total cost of cash (only considering distribution, management, 
handling, processing, recycling and acceptance) at 0.6% of GDP, equivalent to €130 per 
capita. Therefore, if debit and credit cards were to equal this figure (adding another 
€130 per capita), the total cost would be close to 65,000 million Euros. 
 
Against this, the impact report Payments legislative package - 24.07.2013 20 estimates 
that MSCs will reach 14,000 million Euros per year and MIFs about 10,000 million. 
What the Commission intends is to reduce both fees to save merchants around 6,000 
million Euros per year, although it does not provide any estimation of how issuing and 
acquiring banks of debit and credit cards will respond to this. 
 
If this were put into practice in a way similar to the reduction imposed in Spain (Iranzo 
et al, 2012)21 by a forced agreement between merchants associations and schemes to 
compensate for the loss of this 6,000 million Euros per year, banks would raise fees for 
the emission and maintenance of cards for consumers, and fees for POS terminal 
installation and maintenance for merchants. But in addition, the total volume of 
transactions and the replacement of cash by cards would slow down, with the 
consequent negative impact on the underground economy and tax revenues22, as well as 
a relative increase in the proportion of 100 and 500 euro banknotes. 
 
Of course, as a compensating mechanism, banks could also increase other revenues as 
discussed in Chapter 4, by means of the income from interest rates on credit cards. But 
among their list of possible compensatory resources banks possess over a dozen 
commissions which can be raised to avoid losing revenue. Otherwise, both these entities 
as well as many other large operators would incur large reductions in revenue and even 
losses in the payment cards business. 
 
In any case, up until now there has not been enough information to even estimate other 
possible effects on other costs not previously considered, which would in principle be 
all those in Table 1, which are largely excluded even as private costs. In a full estimate, 
to these would have to be added internal costs and transfers or offset costs. In this way 
the sum total of economic costs could be arrived at, which together with externalities 
and opportunity costs would give us a more complete picture of the entirety of social 
                                                          
20 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/framework/index_en.htm 
 
21 
Iranzo J., Fernandez P., Matías G. and Delgado M. The effects of the mandatory decrease of 
interchange fees in Spain. July 2012.  MPRA Paper 43097. University Library of Munich, Germany. 
Website: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43097/; Econ Papers website: 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/43097.html 
 
22
 Ruesga, S. and Carbajo, D. (2013), El “tax gap” en España. Definición, estimaciones y medidas 
dinámicas para su reducción. 
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costs. Precisely in this study we aim to address this lack of information in the European 
Union. 
5. Historical intervention in MIFs 
Governments considering market interventions rarely use theoretical models to fix 
MIFs, nor does the European Commission with its aforementioned proposed legislative 
package. Justifications tend to focus on the benefits to competition, consumers, 
innovation, promotion of means of payment, and so on, although the consequences tend 
not to have been adequately studied, with some exceptions such as those of Spain, 
Australia and the U.S. 
Since the 1970s a strong controversy has developed over whether MIFs and their 
translation to MSCs undermine competition. The first country to regulate MIFs was 
Norway in 1989. The most well-known and significant interventions were conducted in 
Australia, Spain and the U.S., in addition to more than thirty countries worldwide. 
 
The European Commission, for example, before the legislative package proposed in 
July 2013, spent nearly a decade reducing cross-border MIFs. A study of the Payments 
System Board of the Reserve Bank concluded that MIFs were too high and did not 
conform to the rules of competition. For this reason in 2000 Visa and MasterCard were 
forced to remove their “no surcharge rules”23  and reduce their MIFs. Many authors, 
most recently Evans et al (2011)24 have pointed out that the theoretical basis of such 
measures is far from clear, including the further proposal for reduction of MIFs in the 
U.S. (Federal Reserve System, 2010)25. 
 
What is considered reasonable by many academics would be achieving a more socially 
efficient structure for the entirety of fees, not simply reducing one or another, to give in 
the end a greater weight to consumers, as indicated by Evans, Litan and Schmalensee 
                                                          
23
 Known in the literature as the no-discrimination rule (NDR) it prohibits merchants surcharge card 
payments over other payment methods to try to recover the cost of the MSC. 
 
24
 Evans, David S., Litan, Robert E., Schmalensee, Richard, The Economic Principles for Establishing 
Reasonable Regulation of Debit Card Interchange Fees that Could Improve Consumer Welfare. 
Submission to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 22, 2011. 
25
 Federal Reserve System. 12 CFR Part 235 Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing. Proposed Rules. 
[Regulation II; Docket No. R–1404]. RIN 7100–AD63.  Federal Register. Vol. 75, No. 248. Tuesday, 
(December 28 2010)  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/meetings/2010/20101216/20101216_InterchangeFeePropo
sedRuleDRAFTFRNotice.pdf 
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2011)26, in the already cited report by the Federal Reserve System (2010), or, earlier, 
Stillman et al (2008)27. 
 
The rules on intervention sometimes have been agreed after long public debates, but 
they have never been accompanied by the corresponding reports of benefits and costs, 
despite affecting the interests of consumers, merchants and issuers or acquirers of credit 
cards. Nor do we find rigorous and thorough evaluations of the expected results for the 
whole economy and society in general. 
 
6. The payment cards market in Europe. Costs and Revenue  
We will analyze the characteristics of different national payment cards markets in 
Europe, studying the most important countries in terms of their volume of card 
payments and trying to identify to what extent the “European market” can generally be 
characterized. 
According to the European Central Bank data (Table 6.1), by 31 December 2011 there 
had been a volume of card payments through point-of-sale (POS) terminals of nearly € 
2 trillion in the European Union. However, there are significant differences between the 
27 member states. The country where the most payments are made (see Annex, Table 
A1) is the UK, with nearly 30.2% of total payments in the EU, followed by France 
(more than 20.6%). Germany, Italy and Sweden together represent a volume of 
payments similar to that of France. Spain, the fifth largest volume in the European 
market represents just 5.5% of the total. But, as we shall see later, despite the great 
importance of the UK and French markets, it is the other countries where the 
penetration of payment cards is higher. 
 
Table 6.1. Value of transactions per type of payment cards in the EU. 2011 
TOTAL 
Billed 
Volumes at 
POS 
Billed 
Volumes 
DEBIT 
Billed 
Volumes 
CREDIT(1) 
% 
Credit 
/ Total 
Per capita 
TOTAL 
B.volumes 
Per capita 
DEBIT 
B.volumes 
Per capita 
CREDIT(1) 
B.volumes 
1915245 1186837 728408 38.0% 3.812 2.362 1.450 
millions of euros  thousands of euros 
(1) Including debit delayed.     
Source: European Central Bank, Eurostat and own calculations 
                                                          
26
 Evans, David S., Litan, Robert E. and Schmalensee, Richard, The Economic Principles for Establishing 
Reasonable Regulation of Debit-Card Interchange Fees that Could Improve Consumer Welfare (February 
22, 2011). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769890  o http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1769890 
27
 Stillman, Robert, Bishop, William, Malcolm, Kyla and Hidebrandt, Nicole, Regulatory Intervention in 
the Payment Card Industry by the Reserve Bank of Australia. Analysis and evidence. CRA International. 
London, April 28. 2008 
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In the EU the debit card is used to a greater extent: 62% of the volume of transactions in 
2011were debit transactions with the remaining 38% being credit and deferred debit 
operations. But in some countries the situation is reversed: thus, credit and deferred 
debit account for up to 83% in Greece, 69% in France and 58% in Spain and 
Luxembourg, and close to 50% in Cyprus, Malta, Italy and Ireland. In the rest of the EU 
debit transactions overshadow the other types. 
The use of cards as a payment method seems to be related to the higher income level of 
different countries, although there are some notable exceptions. In per capita terms, the 
average expenditure via payment card in 2011 was 3,812€, but within a very large 
range: the country where the per capita expenditure is highest is Luxembourg (11,070€), 
followed by Denmark, Sweden and the UK (between 10000-9000 €/pc). Then come 
Finland, France, Holland, Belgium, Portugal and Ireland (6700-5100 €/pc) with Spain, 
Germany, Estonia and Italy between 2,300 and 2,000 €/pc. 
Regarding the total number of payment cards, at the end of 2011 there were 726.6 
million cards in the EU, of which 460.7 million were debit cards (63.4%) and 249.3 
million were credit cards (36.6%) (See table 6.2 and Annex A2). In per capita terms 
this represents an average1.4 cards per person (0.9 credit and 0.5 debits). In comparison, 
in the U.S., Australia or the United Kingdom where card usage is more widespread, 
there are 2.6 cards per capita. 
 
 Table 6.2. Number of  cards in the EU. 2011. 
TOTAL 
Number 
of cards 
DEBIT 
Total 
cards 
CREDIT 
Total 
Cards  
% 
Credit / 
Total 
Per capita 
TOTAL 
Cards 
Per capita 
DEBIT 
Cards 
Per capita 
CREDIT 
Cards 
726.572 460.727 265.845 36.6% 1.4 0.9 0.5 
millions  number of cards 
Source: European Central Bank, Eurostat and own calculations 
 
During any one year there are a huge number of card transactions in the EU (over 37 
billions, Table 6.3). Debit cards are used much more than credit and deferred debit 
cards; approximately 2.5 times more. However, the average payment using credit cards 
and deferred debit cards is notably higher than that of debit cards 66 Euros versus 45 
Euros). 
Perhaps the best indicator to measure the varying use of cards as a means of payment is 
the number of payments per capita in a year. In the EU, the average number of 
payments per capita is 74 payments a year, of which 52 are debit and 22 are credit 
and/or delayed debit. However, in those European countries where use of cards is most 
widespread (see Table A3 in the appendix), where more payments per capita are made - 
17 
 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland - this number reached more than 200 payments in 2011. 
Also with a very high volume of payments, between 160 and 120 payments per capita, 
are the UK, Holland, Estonia, Luxembourg, France and Portugal. Below the average, 
with around 50 payments a year per capita come Austria, Spain, Slovenia, Cyprus and 
Lithuania. Well below the average is Germany with 36 and Italy with 26 payments per 
capita. In Greece, Bulgaria and Romania the per capita figure was less than 10 
payments per year. 
 
Table 6.3. Number of transactions per payment card in the EU. 2011. 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Eurostat and own calculations 
 
With regard to the total number of payments differentiated by types of cards, data for 
debit card payments are very similar to the total payments, discussed in the previous 
paragraph. Regarding credit card payments, it is worth noting the high volume 
differential with respect to the EU average (19 credit payments per capita in 2011) in 
some countries: Luxembourg (66), France (51), the UK and Sweden (37), Spain (29). 
As we can see with these data, the average of the EU is scarcely representative: it does 
not characterize any of the 27 countries studied, not even the United Kingdom and 
France, which together represent over 50% of the market volume. 
 
7. Differences in income and profitability indicators 
We have conducted a detailed analysis of the various sources of revenue, cost and 
profitability of the various European countries. Unfortunately, we have not been able to 
do this for all types of payment cards due to lack of statistical data. We have only been 
able to find detailed information for credit cards and deferred debit cards. These, as we 
have seen, represent 38% of the total volume of card transactions in the EU. Our study 
includes the twenty largest national EU markets28, which represent 99% of the total 
volume of payments in the EU. 
Differences between the countries of the EU are very significant, not only from the 
point of view of the availability or use of credit cards as a method of payment, but also 
with respect to the structure of the revenues and costs in each country and with respect 
                                                          
28
 We used a database with information on the use of credit cards for the twenty largest countries of the 
European Union, all part of the EU27 but excluding Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Cyprus and Malta. 
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to the profitability of each of the credit card markets. All this is related to different 
models of revenue (commissions) and cost structures and with patterns of card use in 
each country. 
Income sources and their characteristics are as follows: some revenue occurs on an 
irregular basis (such as Card Issuance Fees); other revenue occurs only once a year 
(Card Maintenance Fees) and other income depends on the volume of payments and are 
made for each specific operation (income from Merchant Service Charges). 
Other types of income depend on whether the user decides to finance a purchase by 
credit or not, a decision which may vary for each specific transaction, along with the 
credit period, which will determine the Credit Interest Income (which we have 
computed net of cost of funding). Finally, in the concept of Other Income we have 
gathered a set of variables that incorporate other fees such as those charged by currency 
exchanges (if the card is used to make payments in a currency other than that of the 
country where the card is issued), fees for overdrafts, fees for reimbursements, fees for 
using the card to withdraw cash at ATMs, and others. 
 
And on the cost side we have differentiated between Net Credit Losses (just for credit) 
and Operating expenses. 
 
Structure of revenue and cost in payment transactions by credit card and debit card 
 
(*)Not applicable for debit transactions. 
 
PROFIT 
BEFORE 
TAX 
Total 
Revenue 
Net Interest 
Revenue (*) 
Merchant 
Service Charge 
Revenue 
Card Fee 
Revenue 
Other Income 
Total 
Expenses 
Net Credit Losses (*) 
Operating Expenses 
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In terms of the EU average (Table 6.4), 49.2% of the revenue comes from Credit 
Interest, 21.1% from MSCs, 14.9% from Other Fees and the remaining 14.4% from 
Card Maintenance Fees. As we can see, the Merchant Service Charges are by no means 
the most important source of income. The most significant overall is income from credit 
interest, although this varies for each country analyzed. Thus, income from credit 
interest is the most important source for the Czech Republic and Hungary (around 
75%), the UK and Greece (70%), Spain, Romania and Ireland (between 65% and 50%). 
 
Table 6.4 Structure of CREDIT CARD revenue in the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ECB, Lafferty Consultants and own data 
 
Income from credit interest accounts for over 40% of market revenue from credit cards 
in Portugal and France, and between 30% and 20% in Poland, Denmark, Slovakia and 
Germany. However, for the other countries studied, income from credit interest is the 
least important source of income and in some cases is virtually nonexistent (Italy, 
Finland, Austria or Sweden). These data show very different patterns of behavior 
among EU countries regarding the use of credit cards, as in some countries they are 
used to defer payments but are not really financing credit as such. 
With respect to income from MSCs these represent 21.1% of total revenues for the EU 
average. The percentage for each country is determined by the absolute level of their 
MSC, by varying card use and the relative weight of the remaining sources of income. 
Here too there are significant differences among the countries studied, from around 50% 
of the total income (Annex Table A4) in Slovenia, Austria, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, to about 40% in Belgium and Italy, around 30% in Germany, Ireland, France, 
Finland, with other countries around the EU average (Denmark), to those below the 
average (under 21.1%) in the case of UK, Greece, Spain, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. The relationship between MIFs and MSCs for credit and deferred debit is 
about 1 to 1.5. Thus the average EU MIF for credit operations and deferred debit 
operations stands at 0.67% while the MSC average is 1.02%. But again there are 
significant differences between countries: thus, both rates are virtually equal in 
Denmark (0.6%), Spain (0.66 % vs. 0.70 %) and Poland (1.5% vs. 1.6%). 
Annual card fees represent a percentage of revenue of 50% in Slovakia and Italy and 
about a third in Finland, Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia, with the effective average 
Incomes per credit card 
Net 
Interest 
Revenue 
Merchant 
Service 
Card 
Revenue 
Card 
Fee 
Revenue 
Other 
Income 
49,2% 21,1% 14,4% 14,9% 
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fee29 per card being 17.6 Euros in 2011 and ranging from more than 31 Euros per card 
in Spain, more than 20 Euros Greece, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Finland or Netherlands, 
to 5 Euros per card in the UK. In Ireland such commissions are not charged30. 
Finally, Other Income (for currency exchange, refunds, withdrawals at ATMs, and so 
on) represent up to a third of total revenues in Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Finland and 
Denmark, around 20% in Germany, Ireland and Romania and around the average of 
15% or less for the other countries. 
Regarding expenditure, for the EU average operating costs represent around two thirds 
of total expenditure, while the remaining third would be costs specifically associated 
with credit losses. But once again the differences between countries are considerable, 
depending on the degree of utilization of credit and the level of fraud and unpaid in each 
market. Thus, the costs associated with credit account for over 50% for the UK and 
Ireland, and between 40% and 50% for Spain, Romania, Poland, Greece and Hungary. 
By contrast, this figure is less than 10% in countries such as Austria, Finland, Germany 
and Slovenia. 
Finally, as far as the profitability indicators for 2011 (see Table 6.5) in the credit card 
and deferred debit card market are concerned, overall the countries of the EU had a 
gross margin before tax of 6,232 million Euros, representing 0.8% over total value of 
transactions of nearly 728 billion Euros. Measured as gross profit before tax over total 
revenues this stood at 18.9% with 23.1 Euros margin per card. These are the averages, 
but the range is very broad: the most profitable country in 2011 was Slovenia was 
followed by the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden, Austria and Finland. Countries with 
lower profitability indicators would be Greece, Ireland and Hungary. The other 
countries were around the average for the whole EU. 
   
8. Simulation of the EC proposal to reduce MIFs 
In July 2013 the European Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation31 
regulating different issues related to MIFs. Specifically, the Commission proposes 
reducing MIFs first for cross-border transactions (Article 3 of the Regulation) and then, 
two years later, also for domestic transactions (Article 4 of the Regulation). The 
Commission presents this proposal because it understands that MIFs are agreed between 
                                                          
29
 Many financial institutions have reported higher annual card maintenance fees, but the concept that 
we are dealing with in this study is the effective average maintenance fee, calculated as the ratio 
between this revenue and the total number of credit cards. For example, the theoretical average of 
credit card maintenance fees in the UK is 25 euros while the effective average is just 5 euros, since many 
institutions do not charge such fees to their preferential customers. 
 
30
 In Ireland there is the government fee (stamp duty) charged for debit/credit although this is not a 
revenue stream for the bank as they collect from the cardholder and pay to the Irish government. 
 
31
 “Propuesta de Reglamento del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre las tasas de intercambio para 
operaciones de pago basadas en una tarjeta”. Brussels, 24.7.2013 COM(2013) 550 final 
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issuers and acquirers of services , but are paid by merchants as MSCs and these, in turn, 
are passed on to their customers. But such arranged MIFs are high and thus generate an 
artificial increase in prices. Therefore, the Commission wants to limits MIFs, generating 
savings estimated at 6,000 million Euros annually in commissions paid as MSCs by 
business, trusting that this cost reduction will be passed on to the final consumer. 
Specifically, the proposal of the European Commission is the reduction for all Member 
States of MIFs for debit transactions to a single rate of 0.2%, and of 0.3% for credit 
transactions. Also a good number of legislative changes (which we will not discuss in 
this paper) are proposed, in order to promote competition and encourage the 
development of the payment cards market. 
 
8.1 Our two scenarios and estimates 
We would suggest that the Commission’s proposal seems very interesting and share the 
Commission’s concern and interest in increasing the penetration of cards as a means of 
payment and their wider use on the part of European consumers; promoting 
transparency and competitiveness may be an appropriate way to achieve this. From the 
income statements of each Member State of the EU, discussed in the previous section, 
we have simulated the effects of this reduction on the market for credit cards and 
deferred debit cards, with the two MIF and MSC scenarios that we presume may best 
reflect the responses of the agents involved over the coming years. 
The objective of the Commission would be to reduce MIFs and that this reduction 
would be transferred to each Member State’s MSC, which is what businesses end up 
paying and what impacts on final consumer costs. But, as we saw in the previous 
section, the relationship between MIFs and MSCs in the EU is 1 to 1.5, on average. 
Thus we might usefully simulate the impact on credit transactions of a reduction in 
MIFs to 0.3% and in MSC to 0.45%. An alternative scenario, which would also be 
interesting given that the philosophy of the Commission as expressed in this Regulation 
would be to end up abolishing MIFs and MSCs in card transactions, would be to assume 
that under the proposed reform MSCs for credit also would be set at 0.3%. 
As we have already noted, the effective EU average MSC in 2011 was 1.02%, which 
generated a volume of commissions (and payments) in the business sector of 
approximately 6.9 billion Euros. The effect of moving to a MSC average of 0.3% would 
be to reduce these fees by 4,909 billion Euros per year32. 
Analyzing this effect in isolation, our estimates for the impact of the reduction of MIF 
and MSC would be that the annual revenue before taxes of all EU operators would be 
reduced by € 4,909 billion and the overall profitability of the industry would go from 
18.9% to 4%. If we study the impact by country we see that 7 of the 20 countries 
surveyed would have negative returns (in order of lower profitability, Netherlands,  
Ireland, Italy, Austria, Poland, Hungary and Denmark); and other countries like 
                                                          
32
 In the Impact Assessment document (Commission Staff Working Document, 2013) the European 
Commission estimates the same impact, when calculated on MIFs, at 3,506 million euros.  
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Germany, Greece, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium would suffer very 
high losses in profitability, down to virtually zero. 
 
Table 6.5. Profitability indicators EU 2011 and Simulation Credit MSC = 0.3%  
 
YEAR 2011 Simulation  MSC = 0.3% 
 
Profits 
before Tax / 
Billed 
Volume 
Profits 
before 
Tax (€ per 
card) 
Profit 
margin 
Profits 
before 
Tax (€ per 
card) 
Profit 
margin 
Lost of 
revenues 
(Mill.€) 
Austria: 1,1% 42,4 38,1% -2,7 -4,1% -120 
Belgium:  0,8% 16,6 29,7% 0,9 2,3% -64 
Denmark 0,3% 10,6 10,2% -0,3 -0,3% -17 
Finland:  1,2% 23,2 39,3% 11,9 25,0% -57 
France: 0,5% 30,6 23,7% 6,0 5,7% -1087 
Germany 1,1% 20,9 26,2% 1,2 1,9% -523 
Greece: 0,8% 17,2 7,5% 3,9 1,8% -69 
Ireland:  0,1% 4,2 2,1% -35,7 -21,7% -85 
Italy: 0,7% 12,1 24,6% -2,6 -7,6% -504 
Netherlands: 0,7% 15,5 22,2% -10,6 -24,1% -155 
Portugal: 1,4% 16,9 21,8% 5,5 8,3% -105 
Spain:  1,4% 21,8 16,5% 16,4 12,9% -230 
Sweden: 1,1% 37,9 39,1% 3,4 5,4% -325 
United Kingdom 1,1% 28,0 14,4% 5,1 3,0% -1401 
Czech Rep. 5,2% 64,3 40,5% 55,7 37,1% -15 
Hungary: 0,5% 4,1 3,1% -0,8 -0,6% -6 
Poland: 0,7% 6,8 10,5% -1,7 -3,1% -83 
Romania: 0,9% 10,4 17,4% 5,7 10,4% -10 
Slovakia:  1,9% 15,7 33,3% 11,2 26,2% -4 
Slovenia 1,4% 25,4 43,4% 3,8 10,4% -28 
TOTAL EU 20 0,8% 23,1 18,9% 4,9 4,0% -4909 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In countries with lower MSCs, such as Spain, the impact would be less significant; 
likewise in those countries where the MSC is a minor source of revenue, such as the 
Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. 
The greatest annual revenue loss caused by the reduction of MIFs and MSCs would 
occur in the United Kingdom (€ 1,400 million loss), followed by France (about €1,100 
million) and Germany and Italy (more than €500 million). 
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For this simulation we have assumed that the sector would not be able to reduce its 
costs and would not compensate for the reduction in MIFs by increasing income from 
other sources. Of course, the capacity of domestic markets to assimilate this reduction in 
income is very different in each country, depending on their particular characteristics. In 
Iranzo et al (2012) we analyzed the experience of the reduction of MIF and MSC in 
Spain by more than 50% between 2006 and 2010: the most important consequence was 
that the reduction of MIFs received by issuing banks was shifted to the MSCs paid by 
merchants, as was to be expected, but this reduction in MSCs brought about a strong 
compensatory increase of more than 50% in annual card fees paid by consumers. As a 
consequence, no effective cost reduction reached the consumer, who continued to pay 
about the same. But with a significant increase in consumer costs, the penetration of 
payment cards in Spain and their employment by end users is not increasing (it should 
be recalled that the consumer ends up paying all costs in the final price, but MSCs are 
not perceived by consumers as a cost, unlike annual fees) . 
The alternative simulation in which reducing MIFs to 0.3% would imply that MSCs will 
move from 1.02% to 0.45% (keeping the ratio of 1 to 1.5 MIF-MSC), would have less 
impact, reducing profitability in the EU credit card market by around €3,900 million. 
The rate of return, measured as gross profit before tax on total income would go from 
18.9% in 2011 to 6.2% (compared to a drop to 4% with the reduction of the MSC also 
to 0.3%, as discussed above). 
 
9. Conclusions 
The payment cards market is a good example of the so-called two-sided market. These 
markets are characterized by: 1) two sets of agents interacting through a platform, and 
2) the decisions of each set of agents affect the other group, usually through network 
economies and externalities. 
In this paper we have analyzed recent theoretical studies on two-sided markets, 
particularly those that focus on the study of pricing mechanisms and those related to the 
payment cards market. 
One of the most controversial issues in the payment cards market is fixing of 
Multilateral Interchange Fees in four-party systems between banks acquiring and banks 
issuing payment cards. In our study we analyzed a large number of interventions in 
different countries aimed at reducing MIFs. 
Specifically, we studied the proposed regulation presented by the European 
Commission in July 2013 which, among other things, aims to reduce MIFs to a single 
rate of 0.2% for debit transactions and 0.3% for credit transactions, first for cross-border 
transactions and, two years later, also for domestic operations The Commission presents 
this proposal because it believes that the MIFs agreed between issuers and acquirers are 
too high and generate an artificial increase in prices. Through this measure the 
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Commission wishes to promote the penetration of payment cards and facilitate their use 
by European consumers. 
In conducting our study we built a database that allowed us to calculate the profit and 
loss account of the credit card and deferred debit card market across the whole 
European Union (38% of the total card payments market in 2011) and of its 20 major 
domestics markets. These profit and loss accounts show that the payment cards markets 
in the EU are very different and more varied than might be thought. The MIFs are by no 
means the largest source of revenue, accounting for just over 21.1% of total revenues in 
the EU on average and between 5% and 50% in different European countries. In 
addition, the habits of card use in the EU countries are also very varied, with some 
countries using them to make more than 200 payments per inhabitant per year, 
compared with others where this figure is less than 10. As a result of this, the impact of 
this reduction in MIFs would have very different consequences for different countries. 
For the EU as a whole it would mean a significant reduction in profitability (calculated 
as profit before taxes on total income), which would decrease from 18.9 % to 4 %. This 
would suggest a reduction of revenue for the sector of about 4,900 million Euros 
annually, which we would find very interesting if it implied a reduction in costs to the 
consumer. But the point is that in analyzing the consequences, seven countries would 
have negative returns and five would be located very close to the zero profitability 
thresholds. This would mean that they would have to put into action some mechanism to 
compensate for this loss of revenue. Unfortunately experiences in several countries 
(such as Spain and Australia) have shown that reductions in MIFs and MSC in countries 
with narrow margins invariably lead to compensatory increases in other revenue sources 
such as annual fees, cash withdrawal fees at ATMs , and so on. 
As a result, the consumer has received no benefit at all from these measures. The 
consumer has not seen a reduction in costs: on the contrary, the perception has been of 
an increase in the price he has to pay for using cards, given the fact that any reductions 
in prices by businesses is very minimal and is applied to the totality of goods consumed, 
while in strong contrast, instead of facilitating a greater use of cards these measures 
have caused the opposite and undesired effect. 
 
Appendix 1. Methodology of the study 
Statistical information on payment cards in the EU is somewhat scarce and not very 
homogeneous. Banking and financial information is reported to the Central Banks of the 
Member States, but while the Central Banks of some countries regularly publish 
national reports with the most important data for this sector (for example, Bank of 
Spain),  in other countries it is very difficult to access official information. In addition to 
the domestic reports, the European Central Bank (ECB)33 and the Bank for International 
                                                          
33
 European Central Bank (2012), Payments Statistics, June. 
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Settlements (BIS)34 also publish annual reports with some information relevant to this 
sector. 
Private sources of information, usually those developed by prestigious international 
consulting firms, which allow some gaps in official statistical data to be filled, are also 
very useful; notably, Lafferty Consultants, Euromonitor, European Data, Datamonitor, 
DBK, Tatumm. 
In the official sources we can find data on the number of payment cards, number of 
transactions made or turnover at point-of-sale (POS) terminals and cash withdrawals at 
automated teller machines (ATMs) as well as some ratios which allow comparison 
between countries (data per capita, calculations in relation to GDP in each country, 
etc.). However, for some countries the information is very limited. For example, the 
distinction between transactions with credit cards and debit cards35  is not the same in all 
countries. Thus, both the ECB and the BIS classify the total number of payment cards 
into five categories: 
1. Cards with a debit function 
2. Cards with a delayed debit function 
3. Cards with a credit function  
4. Cards with a debit and/or delayed debit function  
5. Cards with a credit and/or delayed debit function  
This classification exists because the operation in the use of debit cards, deferred debit 
cards and credit cards among the different European countries is different. So complex 
is this issue that for France (the second largest payment cards market in the EU) where 
the volume of payments is not recorded in the official statistics, nor is any there any 
differentiation between debit cards and credit cards, and with respect to the number of 
the card the data is recorded in each and every one of the five categories listed; on the 
other hand, in other countries such as Spain, Belgium and Finland information only 
appears in one category for debit cards (usually 1) and one for credit cards (usually 5), 
without which it would be possible to identify the volume of deferred debit payments. 
What does this imply? The criteria used in these studies are to assimilate and compute 
jointly the deferred debit card and credit card data. But depending on the criteria used to 
classify deferred debit in these five categories we find studies indicating that in France, 
credit cards are relatively little used (less than 10%) and other studies showing the exact 
opposite: that France’s use of credit cards (in addition to estimates of deferred debit 
                                                          
34
 Bank for International Settlements (2013), Statistics on payment, clearing, and settlements system in 
the CPSS countries. January. 
35
 In Regulation COM (2013) 550 final, the European Commission defines “debit card transaction” as a 
payment card transaction, including those made with prepaid cards linked to a checking/current account 
or a deposit account, with the amount owed being settled within a period not exceeding 48 hours after 
authorization or the beginning of the operation; and “credit card transaction” is defined as a payment 
card transaction whose amount is settled within more than 48 hours after the authorization or the 
beginning of the operation. 
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cards) is the highest in the EU (68% of the total volume of payments). This has a crucial 
impact on the study, because depending what criteria we use, the volume of payments in 
EU credit card and deferred debit card transactions could be just under € 500 billion or 
as much as €728 billion (i.e. about 50% higher). 
In respect to the official statistics on domestic MIFs and MSCs in different countries, it 
is virtually impossible to find accurate information, with some exceptions, such as the 
Central Bank of Spain. And of course, it is also rare to find detailed official information 
about other sources of income of the payment cards market (total income from credit 
interest, annual card maintenance fees, fees for other items, operating costs, and so on). 
This information is only available from market research conducted by specialist 
consultancies. 
For methodological purposes we chose to use the same data on volume of payments, 
differentiating between debit cards and credit cards plus deferred debit cards, as those 
used in the Impact Assessment undertaken by the European Commission36 (source: 
ECB and its own estimates for France) and also data from the MIFs of this study. We 
have supplemented this information with some partial data from some specialist 
consultancies (Lafferty Consultants, Euromonitor, European Data, Datamonitor, DBK, 
Tatumm, etcv.), in particular data on the structure of the different European markets 
shown in section 6 of this paper. By doing this we are able to avoid the important 
differences which appear among these alternative sources of information, and our 
results can be easily compared with those used in the Impact Assessment of the 
European Commission. 
                                                          
36
 Commission Staff Working Document (2013), Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the 
internal market and amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2013/36/UE and 2009/110/EC and repealing 
Directive 2007/64/EC and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
interchange fees for card-based payment transactions. Brussels, July, SWD (2013) 288 final. 
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Appendix 2 of Tables 
Table A1. 2011 
 
Source: ECB and own calculations. 
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Table A2. 2011 
 
Source: ECB and own calculations. 
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Table A3. 2011 
 
Source: ECB and own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table A4. 
 
% 
Merchant 
Service 
Card 
Revenue 
Average 
MIF 
Credit 
Average 
MSC 
Credit 
% Card 
Fee 
Revenue 
Austria 50,3% 1,00% 1,55% 20,6% 
Belgium 39,3% 0,76% 1,05% 14,4% 
Czech Republic 6,7% 1,17% 1,54% 7,7% 
Denmark 21,1% 0,60% 0,60% 12,3% 
Finland 27,9% 0,75% 0,95% 36,6% 
France 33,5% 0,28% 0,70% 10,0% 
Germany 30,9% 1,20% 1,50% 27,8% 
Greeece 7,6% 1,10% 1,24% 12,4% 
Hungary 4,9% 0,87% 1,21% 16,6% 
Irland 26,4% 0,87% 1,15% 0,0% 
Italy 38,1% 0,70% 1,40% 48,7% 
Netherlands 45,3% 0,81% 1,70% 29,6% 
Poland 16,3% 1,50% 1,60% 31,0% 
Portugal 18,7% 1,20% 1,40% 27,9% 
Rumania 9,6% 1,28% 1,60% 14,0% 
Slovaquia 12,8% 0,70% 1,20% 51,6% 
Slovenia 52,6% 0,97% 1,00% 30,3% 
Spain 7,2% 0,66% 0,70% 23,8% 
Sweden 45,3% 0,86% 1,40% 14,8% 
United Kingdom 15,7% 0,96% 1,20% 2,6% 
TOTAL 20 21,1% 0,67% 1,02% 14,4% 
 
 
Source: ECB, Lafferty Consultants and own calculations. 
 
